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ANTIDISESTABLISHMENTARIANISM:
WHY RFRA REALLY WAS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Jed Rubenfeld*
Two months ago, the Supreme Court struck down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of

1993 (RFRA),1 handing down its most

important church-state decision, and one of its most important fed
eralism decisions, in fifty years. Through RFRA, Congress had pro
hibited any state actor from "substantially burden[ing] a person's
exercise of religion" unless imposing that burden was the "least re
strictive means" of furthering "a compelling governmental inter
est."2 RFRA was a response to Employment Division, Department

of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 3 in which the Supreme
Court abandoned the very same compelling interest test that
RFRA mandated.

Smith,

overturning decades-old precedent, held

that a law burdening religious practices is constitutional so long as it
is a law of general applicability, not targeting religion or any partic
ular religious practices as such.4 RFRA, in effect and by design,
was enacted to "reverse"

Smith.5

But how could Congress displace the Supreme Court on a mat
ter of constitutional law? According to the law's supporters,6 the
* Professor, Yale University Law School. A.B. 1980, Princeton; J.D. 1986, Harvard. Ed. I am especially indebted to Jeff Powell. Thanks are also due to Bruce Ackerman, Akhil
Amar, Chris Eisgruber, and William Van Alstyne.

1. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 65 U.S.L.W. 4612 (U.S. June 25, 1997). The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993), was codified at
42 u.s.c. § 2000bb (1994).
2. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3(b), 107 Stat.
1488, 1488-89.
3. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
4. See 494 U.S. at 879.
5. See President's Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2377 (Nov. 16, 1993) (characterizing RFRA as an exercise of
"power to reverse . . . by legislation, a decision of the United States Supreme Court").
RFRA referred to Smith by name and stated that its purpose was to "restore the compelling
interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972)." Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2(b),
107 Stat. 1488.
6. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress and the Ratchet, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 145
(1995); Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing ofthe Red Herrings: A Defense ofthe Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 589 (1996).
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answer lay in section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,7 which em
powers Congress to "enforce" the free exercise guarantee as it ap
plies against the states.s This answer was buttressed by a line of
voting rights cases dating back to

1966, in which the Supreme Court

upheld under section 5 federal statutes banning states from engag
ing in certain practices despite the fact that the Court itself had pre
viously held the banned practices constitutional.9 Reasoning that
RFRA too merely ratcheted up states' Fourteenth Amendment du
ties beyond the judicially determined constitutional minimum, most
of the lower courts confronting RFRA had found that the statute
fell within the legitimate scope of Congress's section 5 powers.10
The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that RFRA was an at
tempt to "change," rather than to "enforce," the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment,11 whose meaning the judiciary alone has
the ultimate power to determine.12 But the Court did not overrule
the voting rights cases. Rather, it distinguished them, holding that
Congress may

sometimes

"prohibit[ ] constitutional state action in

an effort to remedy or to prevent unconstitutional state action," but
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation,the provisions of this article."). In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940),the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the First
Amendment's free exercise guarantee.
9. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan,384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding under section 5 a ban
on certain voter literacy tests despite the constitutionality of such tests under Lassiter v.
Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959)); South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966) (same under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment); see also City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156,177 (1980) (holding that Congress may under section 5
invalidate state voting laws that have disparate racial impact even though disparate impact is
not unconstitutional as such); Oregon v. Mitchell,400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding a five-year
nationwide ban on voter literacy tests).
10. See, e.g., Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1022 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Congress has not
'overruled' Smith or assumed a paramount authority of constitutional interpretation
[Instead,RFRA] creates a new statutory right designed to buttress the constitutional right."),
cert. granted and judgment vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997); In re Young,82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir.
1996),cert granted and judgment revd. sub nom. Christians v. Evangelical Free Church,117
S. Ct. 2502 (1997); Flores v. City of Boeme,73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996),cert. granted, 117 S.
Ct. 293 (1996),rewJ., 65 U.S.L.W. 4612 (U.S. June 25,1997); Abordo v. Hawaii,902 F. Supp.
1220 (D. Haw. 1995); State v. Miller,538 N.W.2d 573 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995),affd., 549 N.W.2d
235 (Wis. 1996). But see Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1566 (8th Cir.) (McMillian, J.,
dissenting),cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 193 (1996); Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland,928 F. Supp.
591 (D. Md. 1996); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Commn., 913 P.2d 909,937-39 (Cal.
1996) (Mosk, J., concurring),cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2531 (1997).
11. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 65 U.S.L.W. 4612, 4618 (U.S. June 25, 1997) ("RFRA
cannot be considered remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are to have any mean
ing. . . . It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections."),
12. See 65 U.S.L.W. at 4620 ("[I]t is this Court's precedent, not RFRA, which must
control.").
.

.

•

.
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only when the "means" used are "proportionate to [the] ends."13
RFRA, the Court concluded, lacked such "proportionality."14

Boerne will undoubtedly provoke considerable future debate
about the proper scope of Congress's section 5 powers and the
soundness of the Court's "proportionality'' test. A particularly
lively debate will probably develop over the extent to which a mod
ified RFRA, more narrowly tailored or better supported by the
kind of findings the Court deemed most pertinent,15 might be en
acted that would pass constitutional muster. Already RFRA's chief
supporters have urged Congress to reenact RFRA's protections for
religion by compiling a more "careful record" or by invoking differ
ent bases of congressional power.1 6 In this debate over the reach of
section 5 and other grants of federal legislative power - the same
debate that engrossed commentators on RFRA before the statute
reached the Court17 - a more important point will be missed.
RFRA violated the Establishment Clause, and a new RFRA
modified along the lines suggested above would also violate the
Establishment Clause. It is not, however, as some have argued, that
RFRA was so protective of religion that it amounted to an estab
lishment in its own right.18 But if RFRA did not establish religion,
13. 65 U.S.L.W. at 4619.
14. See 65 U.S.L.W. at 4619.
15. The Court found little evidence in the congressional hearings that Congress had acted
to deter governmental practices of the kind "unconstitutional . . . under the Free Exercise
Clause as interpreted in Smith." 65 U.S.L.W. at 4619. Moreover, despite the lack of evi
dence of any "widespread pattern of religious discrimination in this country, " RFRA applied
to all levels of government and all kinds of governmental conduct. See 65 U.S.L.W. at 461819. The statute lacked "termination dates " or "geographic restrictions. " See 65 U.S.L.W. at
4619. Finally, RFRA's "stringent test" would have imposed "substantial costs " on states. See
65 U.S.L.W. at 4619.
16. As reported in the New York Times:
Marc D. Stem, legal director of the American Jewish Congress, urged Congress to
compile a "careful record " of the negative impact that regulations burdening religion
can have on the economy . . . .
Mr. Stem and Douglas Laycock . . . also urged Congress to consider requiring a high
level of protection for religious observances as a condition of receiving Federal money.
Linda Greenhouse, Laws Urged to Restore Religion Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,1997,at All .
17. The best pre-Boerne scholarship arguing that RFRA exceeded the bounds of Con
gress's legislative jurisdiction was William W. Van Alstyne, The Failure ofthe Religious Free
dom Restoration Act Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 DUKE L.J. 291 (1996),
and Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager,Why the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. RE v. 437, 460-69 (1994). For other excellent discus
sions, see, for example, Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implica
tions for RFRA and Separation ofPowers, 56 MoNT. L. RE v. 5 (1995); Scott C. Idleman, The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TEXAS L.
REV 247, 302-22 (1994).
18. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 17,at 452-60. This position might be inferred from
Justice Stevens's short concurrence in Boerne, see 65 U.S.L.W. at 4620 (Stevens, J., concur.
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how could it have violated the Establishment Clause? By seeking
to dictate church-state relations.
Although many have forgotten it, the First Amendment, under
which Congress can "make no law respecting an establishment of
religion,"19 does not only prohibit Congress from establishing reli
gion; it prohibits Congress from dictating to the states how to legis
late religion. The First Amendment excludes Congress from an
entire legislative subject matter. Congress may not dictate a posi
tion on religion to individuals, and it may not dictate a position on
religion to the states.
RFRA did so. RFRA was the first-ever direct effort by Con
gress to prescribe a regulatory framework governing church-state
relations for the country. It marked a massive, unprecedented shift
in the triangular relation among the federal government, the state
governments, and religion. It was a law quintessentially respecting
establishment: RFRA was a congressional effort to dictate the
terms of religious neutrality to which state law must conform.
But RFRA not only sought to regulate a subject matter from
which Congress is expressly excluded. RFRA was also disestablish
ing. It required states to abolish the favoritism of majority religious
practices that their laws of general applicability inevitably effect. In
this way, RFRA violated the First Amendment's specific anti
disestablishmentarian requirement.02 RFRA would therefore have
been unconstitutional even if it had fallen within Congress's section
5 powers, and it will still be unconstitutional if reenacted along the
lines its supporters now propose.
Disabling Congress from dictating church-state relations is not a
matter of protecting state sovereignty, in the sense of carving out a
domain in which states are to have supreme legislative authority. If
Congress could dictate church-state relations, even in the name of
religious diversity and religious neutrality, Congress would have the
power to intercede directly and profoundly into the nation's reli
gious life.21 Paradoxical though it may seem, antidisestablish
mentarianism is essential to the fundamental constitutional
separation of religion and government.
Part I below addresses the meaning of "respecting" establish
ment and explains First Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism.
ring), but Justice Stevens never actually says that RFRA established religion, and his state
ment is, therefore, also consistent with the argument developed in this article.
19. U.S. CONST.amend. I (emphasis added).
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra section II.D.

Antidisestablishmentarianism
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Part II explains how RFRA is a law respecting and in fact disfavor
ing establishment. Part III explains why section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, no matter what its outer boundaries may be, could
not make RFRA - or a new version of RFRA modified in light of
Boerne - constitutional. Part IV adds a postscript on Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, de
fending that case against criticisms that it eviscerates the constitu
tional protection of religion.
I.

RESPECTING ESTABLISHMENT

The first words enacted in amendment of the United States
Constitution were these: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion . . "22 The First Amendment also
bars Congress from making laws "prohibiting" the free exercise of
religion and "abridging" the freedom of speech. 32 Why respecting
establishment?
.

.

Because in 1791, established churches were features of the
American landscape. How many there were is a matter of dispute.
Cobb's 1902 study found two states with establishments of religion
during the founding period; 24 Pfeffer concludes that four had a
"substantial establishment";52 Van Alstyne identifies five;2 6 Levy
says there were seven. 72 Tue truth is that by the standards of mod
em doctrine, almost every state in post-Revolutionary America had
laws establishing religion. 82 For example, from 1776 to 1791, almost
all the states adopted Christian or Protestant tests for public of
fice. 29 The critical point is that while 1780s Americans in some
places, such as Virginia, were fiercely debating and rejecting state
laws that would strike us today - and struck some, including
22.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
U.S. CoNsT. amend.

23. See

I (emphasis added).

24. See SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF REuGious LIBERTY IN AMERICA 512-15 (1902).
25. See LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 141 (rev. ed. 1967).
26. See William Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling
Wall
A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DuKE L.J. 770, 773 n.8 (citing 1 ANSON
PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 559 (1950)).
-

27. See LEONARD

w. LEVY, THE ESTABUSHMENT

CLAUSE 76 (2d ed., rev. 1994).

28. See GERARD v. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 19-68
(1987). Bradley observes that, under the modern definition of establishment, "every" Ameri
can state in the founding period was an "establishment state(]." See id. at 46. Even the most
antiestablishment states "aided, encouraged, and sponsored Christianity, including providing
direct material and financial assistance to religious institutions and societies." Id.
29. See THOMAS J. CuRRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO
supra note 27, at 77. For a brief
state-by-state summary, see MORTON BORDEN, JEWS, TURKS, AND INFIDELS 11-15 (1984).

THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 221 (1986); LEVY,
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Madison, then - as establishing religion,30 Americans elsewhere
were insisting on such laws and had no intention of permitting the
federal government to undo them.
In Massachusetts, for example, the constitution of 1780 author

ized each town to tax its residents "for the support and mainte
nance of public Protestant teachers" of their choosing.31 The laws
of Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont were similar in this
respect.3 2 In every one of these states, a majority of the voters in
each locality "decided which Protestant ministry to settle in the
town and voted a tax on all inhabitants to raise funds for church
construction and a ministerial stipend."33 An individual dissenting
from the majority church typically had the right to direct his money
toward "his own religious sect or denomination,"34 but only if he
could obtain a certificate attesting that he attended another appro
priate place of worship.35
New England's town-by-town establishments had three impor
tant coercive implications. First, all persons were compelled to fi
nance some church. Second, certain Protestants, such as Baptists
and Quakers, were obliged to contribute to their own ministries in
contravention of their religious doctrines, said to forbid any coerced
religious contributions.3 6 Third, the "unchurched," together with
30. From 1776 to 1786, Virginians engaged in a sustained and, by 1785, intense public
debate about the propriety of establishing Christianity in general and about compulsory reli
gious assessments in particular. See THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLU
TIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776-1787 (1977). In 1779, the Virginia legislature had before it not only
Jefferson's famous bill "for Establishing Religious Freedom," which condemned any com
pelled support for religion, but also a bill declaring Christianity to be the "established reli
gion" of the state and calling for general assessments for the support of Christian ministries.
See CURRY, supra note 29, at 139. Neither bill passed. See id. In 1784, Patrick Henry intro
duced another general assessment bill, which Madison argued against on establishment
grounds. See LEVY, supra note 27, at 61-63. Madison elaborated these antiestablishment
arguments in his equally famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.
See JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 298-304 (Robert A. Rutland et al.

eds., 1973). This was one of many petitions circulated and widely subscribed during the pub
lic debate in 1785 over Henry's general assessment bill. See CURRY, supra note 29, at 142-43.
Henry's bill was defeated, and Jefferson's bill passed, in 1786. See id. at 146.
31. See MASS. CONST. OF 1780, Deel. of Rights, art. III, cl. 1, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 93 (William F. Swindler ed., 1975) (herein
after SOURCES).
32. See BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 20-27; LEVY, supra note 27, at 28-51.
33. BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 23.
34. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, Deel. of Rights, art. III, cl. 4, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 93.
35. See BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 23-24.
36. See CuRRY, supra note 29, at 171-72; LEVY, supra note 27, at 33-34. For contempora
neous Baptist protest, see, for example, 2 ISAAC BACKUS, A HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE BAPTISTS 342-46 (photo. reprint 1969) (David Wes
ton ed., 2d ed. 1871), and JoHN LELAND, THE YANKEE SPY (1794), reprinted in THE WRIT-
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those unfortunate enough not to be Christian at all, were forced to
contribute to the majority church against their will.37 At the same
time, churchgoing was often compulsory,38 blasphemy (against the
Christian faith) was everywhere criminal,39 and civil and political
rights were frequently limited to Protestants.4o
These laws were not pre-Revolutionary relics. As in Massachu
setts, they had the imprimatur of the post-1776 state constitutions.41
Nor were they passed without intense public debate.4 2 Baptists and
others vigorously inveighed against them.43 But to most New Eng
land eyes, constitutional recognition of Protestantism, together with
town-by-town establishment of Congregationalism - or, in a few
cases, Presbyterianism - was no evil. On the contrary, New
Englanders had fought for this relation between church and state
from the founding of their colonies right up until 1776.44 "We
might as well expect a change in the solar syst[e]m," John Adams is
INGS OF THE LATE ELDER JoHN LELAND 213, 225 (photo. reprint 1969) (L.F. Greene ed.,
1845).
37. See CURRY, supra note 29, at 166, 182-84; LEVY, supra note 27, at 29, 46-47.
38. See BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 21 ("[I]rregular church attendance cost 3 shillings in
Connecticut and 10 shillings in Massachusetts." (citations omitted)).
39. See id. at 22 ("Criminal prohibitions of blasphemy were just as pervasive
and
amounted to nothing less than an official declaration of the truth of Christianity."); see also
LEONARD W. LEVY, BLASPHEMY: VERBAL OFFENSE AGAINST THE SACRED, FROM MOSES
TO SALMAN RUSHDIE 260-71 (1993). In Maryland, blasphemers were to be "bored through
the Tongue" with a hot iron - for a first offense. See 34 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND: PRO·
CEEDINGS AND Acrs OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY {13) 1720-1723, at 733 {Clayton Colman
Hall ed., 1914).
•

.

.

40. Massachusetts guaranteed that "every denomination of Christians . ..shall be equally
under the protection of the law," MAss. CONST. OF 1780, pt. 1, art. III, cl. 5, reprinted in 5
SOURCES, supra note 31, at 92, 93-94, and required elected officers to declare themselves
Christian, see MAss. CONST. OF 1780, pt. 2, ch. VI, art. I, reprinted in 5 SOURCES, supra note
31, at 100, 106. New Hampshire limited elected office to Protestants. See N.H. CONST. OF
1784, pt. 2, reprinted in 6 SouRCES, supra note 31, at 344, 350, 351. In its first constitution,
Vermont provided, "nor can any man who professes the protestant religion, be justly de
prived or abridged of any civil right" on the basis of religion, VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch. I,§III,
reprinted in 9 SOURCES, supra note 31, at 487, 489, and both founding-era constitutions re
quired Protestant oaths of office, see VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch. II, §IX, reprinted in 9
SouRCES, supra note 31, at 491; VT. CONST. OF 1786, ch. II,§XII, reprinted in 9 SouRcEs,
supra note 31, at 496, 501. Even in Rhode Island, Jews were denied full citizenship. See
BORDEN, supra note 29, at 13; IRVING BERDINE RICHMAN, RHODE ISLAND: A STUDY IN
SEPARATISM 180-81 {1905). Needless to say, such laws were not limited to New England. For
a brief survey, see BORDEN, supra note 29, at 11-15.
41. See LEVY, supra note 27, at 29-30, 43, 46, 49-50.
42. See BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 26.
43. See M. LOUISE GREENE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN CONNECTI·
CUT 372-76 (1905); CHARLES B. KINNEY, JR., CHuRCH AND STATE: THE STRUGGLE FOR
SEPARATION IN NEW HAMPSHIRE 1630-1900, at 75-78 {1955); 1 WILLIA M G. MCLOUGHLIN,
NEW ENGLAND DISSENT, 1630-1833: THE BAPTISTS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHuRCH AND
STATE 613-35 (1971); 2 id. at 789-832, 926-38.
44. See CURRY, supra note 29, at 105-33.
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supposed to have said in 1774, "as to expect they would give up
their establishment." 45
The First Amendment's religion clauses emerged against this
background, growing directly out of powerful antiestablishment and
antidisestablishment concerns about the new Constitution. Some
argued that nothing in the Constitution prevented Congress from
establishing a single national church and violating rights of con
science.46 But many others objected that the document nowhere
paid obeisance to Christian religion and nowhere prevented the na
tional government from abolishing the support for Christianity to
which the laws of many states were dedicated.47 "That the prof
fered Constitution was a pagan document, or at least insufficiently
infused with Christian orthodoxy, was a theme resounding through
out the Union and accounted for perhaps half of all the popular
criticism of the new government's relationship with religion." 48
Federalists replied to all such objections by saying that Congress
had no legislative power over religious matters one way or the
other. Thus Madison told the Virginia convention, "There is not a
shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with reli
gion. Its least interference with [religion], would be a most flagrant
usurpation." 49 Iredell said the same thing in North Carolina:
"They [the Congress] certainly have no authority to interfere in the
establishment of any religion whatsoever ...." so
But such assurances did not assuage either the antiestablishment
or antidisestablishment forces, both of which pressed for amend
ments to memorialize Congress's inability to "interfere" or "inter
meddle" with religious establishments.1s Not surprisingly, the New
45. Isaac Backus, Diary 1774, in 2 THE DIARY OF ISAAC BACKUS 895, 917 (William G.
McLaughlin ed., 1979).
46. See ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 6-7 (1982); CURRY,
supra note 29, at 194-95, 197-98.
47. See BORDEN, supra note 29, at 15-20; BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 74-76; CURRY,
supra note 29, at 195-96.
48. BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 74.
49. James Madison, General Defense of the Constitution (June 12, 1788), reprinted in 11
THE PAPERS OF J AMES MADISON 129, 130 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977).

50. James Iredell, Debate in North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 30, 1788), in 5
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 90 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). Similarly,
Edmund Randolph maintained that "no power is given expressly to Congress over religion."
3 THE D EBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 204 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 1836).
Richard Spaight of North Carolina said, "As to the subject of religion . . . . [n]o power is
given to the general government to interfere with it at all." 4 id. at 208. Perhaps most influ
entially, James Wilson asserted the no-power position in Pennsylvania. See 2 id. at 455.
51. The demand for amendments protecting freedom of conscience is well known. See,
CoRD, supra note 46, at 6-7. Often overlooked, however, is that some states also sought

e.g.,
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England states were particularly jealous of their existing ecclesiasti
cal systems. Thus New Hampshire's ratifying convention proposed
as an amendment that "Congress shall make no Laws touching
Religion, or to infringe the rights of Conscience."5 2 This proposal
"grew out of antifederalist fears that the national government was
insufficiently devoted to Christianity" and was specifically designed
to guarantee "protection from congressional intermeddling with
New Hampshire's regime of publicly maintained orthodoxy."53 As
Professor Amar has pointed out, of all the state-proposed amend
ments on religion, New Hampshire's antidisestablishmentarian pro
posal most closely tracked the actual language eventually adopted
in the First Amendment.5 4
Again not surprisingly, Madison's proposed wording of the reli
gion clauses was antiestablishment - "[N]o religion shall be estab
lished by law"55 - but in no way antidisestablishment. The New
Englanders were "not satisfied."56 They feared any language that
might be construed to "give Congress power to interfere with ex
isting arrangements in the individual states."57 New Hampshire
Representative Samuel Livermore and Connecticut Representative
Benjamin Huntington sought language that would insulate their

to keep Congress from interfering with their pro-Protestant regimes. See, e.g., BRADLEY,
supra note 28, at 76; CURRY, supra note 29, at 203. Some leading federalists were also an
tidisestablishmentarians. John Jay, for example, who recorded no objection to the Constitu
tion's ban on religious tests for federal office, led the fight in New York to impose a
Protestant-test oath for state officeholders. See CURRY, supra note 29, at 162. It is unlikely
that he, any more than Madison, saw or sought anything in the Constitution that would have
empowered Congress "to pass judgment on existing Church-State arrangements in the
states. " Id. at 205. Samuel Livermore, a leading New Hampshire federalist, both proposed
that state's antidisestablishmentarian amendment in Congress, see infra note 58, and, to
gether with eight other New Hampshire federalists, voted in 1791 against a proposition that
would have eliminated religious tests from their state constitution, see BORDEN, supra note
29, at 18.
52. See Ratification of the Federal Constitution by the State of New Hampshire (June 21,
1788), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, 1786-1870, at 143 (Washington, Department of State, 1894).
53. BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 76 (footnote omitted); see also 2 CHARLES E.L. WIN
GATE, LIFE AND LETTERS OF PAINE WINGATE 220-21 (1930).
54. See Akhil Reed Amar, Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, 2 ROGER WMS. U. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1996).
55. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 729 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). Actually, Madison's first draft
of the Establishment Clause (presented to Congress on June 8, 1789) had read, ''nor shall any
national religion be established. " Id. at 434. Madison suggested that the word "national"
ought to placate those concerned about threats to state-law or local-law establishments. See
id. at 731.
56. See id. at 731 ("Mr. Livermore was not satisfied with that amendment . . . . ").
57. CURRY, supra note 29, at 203.
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states' local-establishment systems from federal attack.SS They
achieved this result, and the Madisonians achieved theirs at the
same time, when the Establishment Clause took its final form,
prohibiting Congress from making any law "respecting an establish
ment of religion."59
Thus "respecting" does not mean "showing respect for." It does
not mean "tending toward." There were two kinds of paradigmatic
abuse of congressional power that those who fought for the Estab
lishment Clause fought to prevent. A law establishing Anglicanism
as the national religion would have been one such abuse. But a law
declaring that individuals could not be taxed locally "for a support
of ministers or building of places of worship"60 would also have
been a paradigmatic usurpation. "Respecting" means "with respect
to" or "regarding." Congress can make no law concerning an estab
lishment of religion. 61 As Corwin observed fifty years ago, and as
many scholars have reminded us since, "respecting" in the First
Amendment is "a two-edged word, which bans any law disfavoring
as well as any law favoring an establishment of religion."62
In this way, - the First Amendment excludes Congress from an
entire subject-matter jurisdiction. Justice Story, himself an estab58. Huntington "said that he feared . . . that [Madison's] words might be taken in such
latitude as to be extremely hurtful to the cause of religion. " 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra
note 55, at 730. His paraphrased remarks go on:
The ministers of their congregations to the Eastward were maintained by the contribu
tions of those who belonged to their society; the expense of building meeting-houses was
contributed in the same manner. These things were regulated by by-laws. If an action
was brought before a Federal Court on any of these cases, the person who had neglected
to perform his engagements could not be compelled to do it; for a support of ministers or
building of places of worship might be construed into a religious establishment.
Id. at 730. Livermore, who according to Levy had drafted the New Hampshire proposal, see
LEVY, supra note 27, at 100, then reintroduced the New Hampshire language as a motion to
amend Madison's language, and the House approved Livermore's language by a vote of 3120. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 55, at 731.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
60. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 55, at 731 (remarks of Rep. Huntington); see also
supra note 58.
61. See CoRD, supra. note 46, at 9 "The word 'respecting"' in the First Amendment "is
synonymous with 'concerning, regarding, about, anent'
"); 3 JosEPH STORY, COMMENTA·
RIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1873 at 730 (Da Capo Press 1970)
(1833) ("[I]t was deemed advisable to exclude from the national government all power to act
upon the subject. ").
62. Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CON·
TEMP. PRoBs. 3, 12 (1949); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution,
100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1157 (1991); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment
Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 Aruz. ST. L.J. 1085, 1091 (1995)
("This wording simultaneously forbids the federal government from establishing a religion at
the federal level, or attempting to disestablish religion at the state level. "); William K. Liet
zau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation,
39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1199 (1990).
. • . .
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lishmentarian when it came to the law of his home state of Massa
chusetts, painted this exclusion with the broadest possible brush:
"[T]he whole power over the subject of religion is left exclusively to
the state governments, to be acted upon according to their own
sense of justice ....
"63 Story's reading may be too extreme although, echoing Madison, Iredell, and Wilson, it was surely wide
spread in the early period 64 - because the religion clauses do not
compel the conclusion that Congress is wholly powerless over the
subject of religion. There may be distinctively federal domains say, in the issuance of money, in regulating the armed forces, in
making rules for its own legislative sessions, in governing territo
ries, and so on - in which Congress can constitutionally make laws
intermeddling with religion.
But the question becoflleS very different when Congress tries to
regulate matters of faith directly or to tell states what relation their
laws must have to the fostering of one or all religions. Here Con
gress undoubtedly enters the domain of subject-matter exclusion re
ferred to by Story and others. Congress has no power to dictate a
position on religion for individuals, and it has no power to dictate a
position on religion for states. It has no power to dictate church
state relations at all - where "state" refers to the governments of
the several states. This is the core meaning of the Establishment
Clause.
This means that Congress may not try to dictate church-state
relations even to vindicate religious toleration or free exercise. A
disestablishmentarian law will characteristically vindicate tolerance
and free exercise - as did Jefferson's famous antiestablishment bill
in 1780s Virginia.65 To the extent that states can constitutionally
enact laws favoring one religion over others, Congress can make no
law instructing them not to do so. That would be a quintessential
violation of the First Amendment, and that is just what RFRA did.

63. 3 STORY,supra note 61,§ 1873, at 731. Story believed that the states had a "duty .. .
to foster, and encourage [Christianity] among all the citizens and subjects." Id. § 1865, at
723. He thus argued against complete disestablishment in Massachusetts. See 2 McLouGH
uN, supra note 43, at 1150, 1158, 1255; Lash, supra note 62, at 1094-95.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
65. Jefferson's antiestablishment bill,discussed at supra note 30, provided in part that "all
men shall be free to profess .. . their opinions in matters of religion " without affecting their
"civil capacities," and that "no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious
worship, place, or ministry whatsoever." Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom,in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545, 546 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
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ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

RFRA was a direct, unprecedented congressional effort to gov
ern church-state relations. It purported to dictate to the states the
relation to religion that all their laws must adopt and all their ac
tions must observe. It prevented states from favoring a single reli
gion in their laws, and it prevented states from affording no
protection to religion in their laws. Through RFRA, Congress
claimed the power to determine what counts as sufficient and insuf
ficient state neutrality toward all religion and especially toward the
practices of religious minorities.
The analysis could almost stop here: RFRA cut straight into the
heart of the legislative domain from which the Establishment
Clause excludes Congress. It was for this reason alone unconstitu
tional. But to make plain just how deeply RFRA violated the core
meaning of the Establishment Clause - and to respond to certain
objections that might be raised - I want to draw out the additional
point suggested above: that RFRA was in fact a disestablish
mentarian law.
How can this be? RFRA protected religious practices; it pro
tected all religious practices, right across the board. How could it
also be disestablishmentarian?
A.

Majority and Minority Religions

RFRA sought to eradicate state favoritism of majority religious
practices. It did so, moreover, in the name of religious freedom, of
minority religious practices, and of the equal respect due to all reli
gions. These are definitive features of disestablishmentarianism.
A democratic legislature will inevitably defer to majority reli
gious practices but will not extend the same solicitude to less promi
nent religions. This was the constant refrain of Smith's critics and
RFRA's champions:

In a world in which some beliefs are more prominent than others, the
political branches will· inevitably be selectively sensitive toward reli
gious injuries. Laws that impinge upon the religious practices of
larger or more prominent faiths will be noticed and remedied. When
the laws impinge upon the practice of smaller groups, legislators will
not even notice, and may not care even if they do notice.66
66. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 51 U. Cm.
1109, 1136 (1990); see also Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An
Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 21 (1994)
L. REV.

("A prime goal of granting ... exceptions ... is to ensure that minority religious practices
receive the same consideration in the courts that majority practices already receive in the
political process."); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants ofFree Exercise, 1990 SuP. Cr. REV. 1,
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The Smith Court itself acknowledged the point: "[L]eaving ac
commodation to the political process will place at a relative disad
vantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in."67
That is why liquor stores close on Sunday, not Saturday. 68 That is
why our laws of general applicability systematically favor, implicitly
and explicitly, majority religious practice. 69 And that is why
RFRA, taken as a whole, would have had so profound a disestab
lishing effect: in the name of protecting all religions equally, it
would have abolished the favoritism of majority religion incorpo
rated in general state law.
An example. Consider a state statute defining marriage in the
traditional way. This is just the kind of state action to which RFRA
would have applied. Traditional marriage laws represent the single
greatest instance of the constitutionally permissible imposition
through law of a definite, widespread - but by no means universal
- religious tradition. If a religious polygamist had brought a
RFRA action, RFRA would have required the state to show a com
pelling governmental interest in traditional marriage laws - a task
that Hawaii recently failed to discharge70 and one that, to be frank,
could be satisfied only by eviscerating the compelling interest test.71
The judge in such a case would have had to decide whether the
state had given excessive official sanction in its laws to the articles
of faith of a certain religious tradition. It is hard to imagine a fed
eral law today more plainly respecting - and disfavoring - an es
tablishment of religion than RFRA
.

15 ("[T]he majority's deeply held beliefs will nonnally be reflected in legislation without an
exemption. ").
67. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
68. The Supreme Court upheld Sunday laws against establishment clause attack in Mc
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 {1961). There can be no doubt, however, that Sunday laws
raise genuine establishment issues. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 431-35; 366 U.S. at 576-77
(Douglas,J., dissenting from Establishment Clause holding); Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502,
505 (1858) (striking downa Sunday law under the state constitution because it "enforce[s],as
a religious institution, the observance of a day held sacred by the followers of one faith ").
69. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 101-03 (1995).
70. See Baehr v. Miike,CIV No. 91-1394,1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996)
{holding that no compelling state interest supports a ban on same-sex marriages).
71. Condemnation of polygamy is moral. If enforcing majority morals is a compelling
state interest,there is an end to some once-prized constitutional rights. Under current doc
trine, the rights to privacy, to equal protection,and to free speech can all be overridden by
laws narrowly tailored to achieve compelling state interests. See generally Stephen E.
Gottlieb,Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed Term in Constitu
tional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L.REv. 917 (1988) {collecting cases). Thus, if enforcing majority
morality is a compelling interest,then Roe should almost certainly be overturned, Brown was
probably wrong,and the most basic principle of free speech doctrine - precluding censor
ship of opinions that a majority finds morally repugnant - no longer holds.

2360

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:2347

I have no objection to Congress's undoing traditional marriage
law in the name of religious freedom, except that Congress's doing
so would be unconstitutional. No doubt we are all for states treat
ing various religions with equal respect, but it is not for Congress to
dictate what the terms of this equal respect must be.
"But traditional marriage laws are not establishments," some
one might say. "The Supreme Court has so held.72 Do you mean
that your argument depends on the claim that polygamy laws really
should have been regarded as establishments all this time?"
No. RFRA violated the Establishment Clause regardless of
whether the state measures it attacked were establishments. Con
gress makes a law respecting an establishment of religion whenever
it instructs states either to stop favoring in their law certain reli
gious practices or to start favoring them. That is what it means to
say that the Establishment Clause imposes a subject-matter limita
tion on congressional power. Through RFRA, Congress instructed
states to stop favoring majority religious practices by dictating
terms of neutrality applicable to the practices of all religions. Wor
thy as it may have been, that goal is precisely what the Establish
ment Clause forbids Congress to pursue.
This conclusion is important, and it deserves further elabora
tion. Someone might say: "I really don't see that. If state marriage
laws are not establishments within the meaning of the First Amend
ment, then I don't see how a federal statute requiring a religious
exemption from them is a law respecting or concerning establish
ment at all. It is a law protecting religious freedom, to be sure, but
it does not establish or disestablish anything."
According to this objection, a law could not violate the Estab
lishment Clause unless it either established religion or concerned a
state practice that established religion, in the accepted or judicially
determined meaning of that term. In one sense, this reading would
make the antidisestablishment principle appealingly simple: dises
tablishment could take place only after an establishment. In an
other sense, this reading would make the antidisestablishment
principle rather strange: Congress would be free to block state fa72. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162-66 (1879) (upholding a bigamy law as
secular in nature). The idea that the federal antipolygamy statute - which governed not
states, but federal territories - rested on secular grounds might have surprised its congres
sional adherents, who called polygamy an "'offense against religion, and against the laws of
God,'" and who defended Congress's duty to "'enforce among them (the Mormons] the ca
nons of an approved and Christian morality."' See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption ofthe
Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1106, 1126 (1994) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1498, 1515 (1860)).
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voritism of religion unless the state were favoring it too extremely
or blatantly, in which case Congress would perversely be powerless
to act.
But putting this strangeness aside, an independent reason makes
this reading of the Establishment Clause untenable. It misses the
core meaning of the clause. Did New England's ecclesiastical laws·
described earlier73 establish religion within the then accepted or
then judicially determined meaning of the term? The supporters of
New England's laws - the very men who fought for an amendment
prohibiting Congress from interfering with them - overwhelmingly
denied that these laws established.74 The core purpose of the
Establishment Clause's antidisestablishmentarian component was
to bar Congress from tampering with state religion laws, whether or
not those laws amounted to actual establishments.
How could anyone have denied that New England's compulsory
assessment systems were establishments? As explained by
Zephaniah Swift, whom Levy calls "Connecticut's leading jurist" of
the founding era,75 "No sect [in Connecticut] is invested with privi
leges superior to another. No creed is established, and no test act
excludes any [from office]."7 6 Similarly, Chief Justice Jeremiah
Smith of New Hampshire held that a "religious establishment is
where the State prescribes a formulary of faith and worship,"
whereas in his state "[n]o one sect is invested with any political
power."77 Bradley may overstate the point, but he surely captures
considerable eighteenth-century New England sentiment when he
says that the framers of the New England state constitutions which not only authorized the local-autonomy systems described
earlier, but also proclaimed that "no subordination of any one sect
73. See supra text accompanying notes 31-40.
74. "As the American Revolution approached, " in Curry's words, '"establishment' be
came another synonym for English tyranny" and "New Englanders would begin to play down
or even deny that their system amounted to an establishment at all." CURRY, supra note 29,
at 129. As early as 1768, a leading Massachusetts pamphleteer declared: " 'We are in princi
ple against all civil establishments in religion; and as we do not desire any such establishment
in support of our own religious sentiments, or practice, we cannot reasonably be blamed if we
are not disposed to encourage one in favor of Episcopal [that is, Anglican] colonists.' " Id. at
128 (quoting CHARLES CHAUNCY, THE APPEAL TO THE PUBUC ANSWERED' 152 (Boston,
Kneeland & Adams 1768)).
75. See LEVY, supra note 27, at 47.
76. 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAws OF THE STATE OF CoNNEcncUT 142
(Windham, John Byrne 1795). Even a "Jew, a Mehometan, or a Bramin " could worship as he
pleased, wrote Swift, and no Christian suffered "any inconvenience, but the payment of his
tax to support public worship in the located society where he lives.'' 1 id. at 146.
.
77. Muzzy v. Wilkins, Smith (N.H., 1, 9, 12-13 (N.H. 1803).
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or denomination to another shall ever be established by law"78 "fully intended to disestablish religion and understood nonestab
lishment to be the effect of their work."79 It was rather the oppo
nents of compulsory-assessment regimes who damned them as
establishments.so
Thus the New Englanders who fought for an antidisestablish
mentarian First Amendment did not by any means concede that
their states had actually established religion. Quite the opposite:
they denied that their laws established, but they feared that the fed
eral government might try to abolish or change their laws according
to its own determination of the proper neutrality between govern
ment and religion.81 The Establishment Clause was enacted pre
cisely to render Congress irrelevant in the debate over what did and
did not amount to an establishment. Congress had no power to
force the states to dismantle their support for religion even if their
laws were not in fact establishments of religion. Indeed, Congress
had no authority to interfere with these laws especially if, as their
supporters claimed, they were not establishments.
Yet it might be felt that this conclusion somehow does not make
sense of the text. How can a federal law respect an establishment
of religion if there was no establishment in the first place? How can
RFRA be disestablishing if there is nothing established for it to dis?
This question asks in effect how those who fought for an antidis
establishment clause could have logically believed both (1) that the
78. E.g., MAss. CONST. OF 1780, pt. I, art. III, cl. 5, reprinted in 5 SOURCES, supra note 31,
at 94.
79. BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 24. Bradley may overstate the point, because it appears
that some New Englanders agreed that their systems established in a sense, or at least ex
pressed doubt about whether they did, but nevertheless defended their ways as poles apart
from the opprobrious form of establishment associated with the Church of England. See
CURRY, supra note 29, at 183-84. Thus, Adams at the First Continental Congress in 1774
responded to Baptist and Quaker protests by saying, according to his later recollection, that
the "laws of Massachusetts were the most mild and equitable establishment of religion that
was known in the world, if indeed they could be called an establishment." John Adams,
Diary of 1774, in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 326, 399 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Bos
ton, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1850).
80. See, e.g., CURRY, supra note 29, at 172, 182-83, 189; JoHN LELAND, THE RIGHTS OF
CONSCIENCE INALIENABLE, reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND,
supra note 36, at 177, 186; LEVY, supra note 27, at 31-32, 47-48, 50; JOSEPH FRANCIS THORN·
ING, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN TRANsmoN 33-35 {1931) {describing attacks on New England
regimes as favoring Congregationalism). In Virginia, Madison and others expressly opposed
the general assessment bill as an establishment of religion. See LEVY, supra note 27, at 62-63,
67; supra note 30.
81. As noted earlier, Representative Huntington of Connecticut said he feared that his
state's town-by-town compulsory-assessment system could be federally attacked because it
"might be construed into a religious establishment. " 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 55,
at 730; see also supra note 58.
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state laws they wanted to protect were not establishments, and (2)
that prohibiting Congress from legislating with respect to ("respect
ing") establishment protected these laws. If their states' ecclesiasti
cal laws were not establishments, how could a bar against federal
law respecting establishment stop Congress from tampering with
them? A hypothetical may help answer this question.
Imagine that the Constitution of the United States of the World
is being drafted, together with a World Charter of Rights. All
member states believe, let's suppose, that racial discrimination must
be prohibited. But it turns out there are three camps: some states
are committed to race-based affirmative action; a second group
condemns affirmative action as a species of racial discrimination;
and the final group argues that any law with a sufficiently adverse
disparate impact on racial minorities is discriminatory, regardless of
the intentions of the legislature or the formal neutrality of the law.
Each camp, however, is fearful that the World Congress will not
take its particular view. Hence all want to bar the Congress from
dictating to the member states what counts and what does not count
as racial discrimination. So although the World Congress has been
given broad legislative powers, the First Article of the Charter of
Rights provides: "The Congress shall make no law concerning ra
cial discrimination."
Now suppose that a month later, the World Supreme Court de
finitively holds that racial discrimination requires more than unin
tentional disparate impact. The next day, the World Congress
passes a law forbidding all state action with a substantial disparate
impact on racial minorities, unless the state action is narrowly tai
lored to achieve a compelling state interest. The Congress says in
its defense: "Everyone agrees that disparate impact is not racial
discrimination. Why, the states that engage in it have always denied
that it is discriminatory. So you see it is logically impossible for
anyone to raise a claim that we have made a law concerning racial
discrimination."
But of course the World Congress has done so. It has claimed
the power to determine what counts as proper and improper legal
neutrality toward race, even though denying this power was the
core meaning of prohibiting the Congress from making laws "con
cerning racial discrimination." The case of RFRA - a religious
disparate-impact law - is identical. A core meaning of the Estab
lishment Clause is that Congress has no power to dictate to the
states what counts as proper or improper legal neutrality toward
religion. Congress cannot exercise such a power even if courts have
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held that the state laws Congress attacks are not establishments.
Indeed, Congress cannot exercise such a power even to attack state
laws that merely have a disparate religious impact and no religious
motivation behind them whatsoever.
B.

What Congress Understood

"Just hold on one minute," someone might say. "The point you
never address is that Congress passed RFRA to protect free exercise
principles, not antiestablishment principles. If there were evidence
that Congress believed that it was acting to achieve disestablish
ment, then I might possibly agree with you. But Congress plainly
did not think in those terms; in fact, RFRA explicitly states that it
does not in any way concern establishment.82 If Congress did not
think that it was attacking an establishment problem, then I'm
sorry: whatever its effects, RFRA simply is not a law respecting an
establishment of religion."
This is a crucial objection. The claim is that "respecting an es
tablishment" should be understood narrowly, covering only those
instances in which legislators understand themselves to be making a
law concerning a religious establishment. A law does not "respect"
establishment unless it specifically addresses itself to establishment.
Hence a law "merely" protecting free exercise cannot be a disestab
lishment law.
This objection must be rejected, for three reasons. First, no one
would accept it if the law at issue were charged with establishing
religion, rather than disestablishing it. Could legislators escape the
charge of establishing religion simply by saying (sincerely, let's sup
pose) that they did not regard themselves as establishing religion?
Or by appending to their statute a provision stating that the law
does not "in any way address . . . the establishment of religion"?B3
If they could, so much for the Establishment Clause.
Second, suppose the Second Congress had passed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1792, outlawing all state compulsory
religious assessments, all state religious tests for office, and all state
church-attendance laws. Say that Congress claimed authority for its
statute under Article IV.84 Would this statute have been constitu82. RFRA states that it does not "affect, interpret, or in any way address that portion of
the First Amendment prohibiting Jaws respecting the establishment of religion. " Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L.No. 103-141, § 7, 107 Stat. 1488, 1489.
83. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L.No. 103-141, § 7, 107 Stat. 1488,
1489.
84. Congress might, for example, have claimed that such Jaws were necessary and proper
to guarantee each state a republican form of government. See U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4 ("The
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tional if Congress's claim of Article IV power had been accepted?
Plainly not: as we have seen, the law would still have paradigmati
cally violated the First Amendment. The Establishment Clause was
enacted precisely to prevent Congress from interfering with state
religion laws of just this sort.
But according to the "respecting"-depen9s-on-congressional
intent objection, Congress could easily have passed this religious
freedom law in 1792. It could simply have framed its statute as it
framed RFRA: not as an attack on establishment, but as a defense
of free exercise. This way of framing the Act would have been no
sham. Then as now, Congress could insist on disestablishment, with
logic and sincerity, in the name of free exercise. I am not an
originalist, but when there are core historical applications of what a
constitutional guarantee was enacted to prohibit - core instantia
tions of the kind of exercise of governmental power that was to be
forbidden once and for all - I believe that constitutional interpre
tation has an obligation to preserve these paradigm cases.85 To say
that RFRA escapes the antidisestablishment principle because
Congress was acting to protect free exercise would surrender the
Establishment Clause's paradigm cases. It would advance an inter
pretation of the clause that would have allowed Congress to engage
in precisely those acts forbidden by the core meaning of the clause.
Finally, there is evidence - considerable evidence - that Con
gress did consciously understand RFRA as an attack on
establishment-related problems. Members of Congress repeatedly
defended RFRA in the name of preserving "religious diversity."86
Repeatedly Representatives and Senators said that RFRA was nec
essary to give "minority" religions the same protection already ac
corded to the dominant - ironically, the word sometimes used is
"established" - religions.87 These are prototypical disestablishUnited States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Fonn of Government
"); Pacific States Tel.& Tel.Co.v.Oregon, 223 U.S.118 (1912) (suggesting that Guaran
tee Clause issues are committed to the political branches, not to the courts).
85. See Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J.1119, 1169-84
(1995). For example, no court has the legitimate authority to interpret the Fourteenth
Amendment in such a way that Black codes would be or would have been constitutional.
Such an "interpretation " would rewrite or unwrite what the nation committed to writing.
86. See, e.g., 139 CoNG. REC. H2359 (daily ed.May 11, 1993) (statement of Rep.Gekas)
(describing the "religious diversity " and the "fulsome diversity [sic] " of American religion
that "[w]e are sanctifying today "); id. (statement of Rep. Nadler) ("What has made the
American experiment work ...has been a tolerance and a respect for diversity enshrined in
the freedom of religion clauses of our Bill of Rights."); id. at H2362 (statement of Rep.
Lowey).
87. See, e.g., s. REP. No.103-111, at 7-8 (1993); 139 CONG. REc. H2357 (daily ed.May 11,
1993) (statement of Rep.Fish); see also Brief for the United States at 30, City of Boerne v.
Flores, 65 U.S.L.W. 4612 (U.S. June 25, 1997) (No.95-2074) ("Because minority religions
• • . .
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ment arguments. To call for protection of religious diversity and
religious minorities against state favoritism of dominant religious
practices is the very essence of disestablishmentarianism.
One RFRA supporter in Congress drew these arguments to
gether in a way that makes RFRA's disestablishmentarian nature
unmistakable:
Mr. Speaker . . . . The religious liberties which were a driving
force behind the formation of this Nation have been seriously eroded
by the court ruling in Oregon versus Smith and subsequent cases.
Only enactment of [RFRA] can repair the damage done . . . .
. . . At the time of the establishment of the American colonies,
there was no country in Europe without a state church, and unity of
religion was considered essential to the unity of the state. Those
whose faiths differed from the officially designated religion were pre
vented from practicing their own [religion] . . . .
But in the United States, we have always cherished our religious
liberties. . . . Indeed, our goal in setting public policy has and must
always be to accommodate religious diversity to the maximum extent
possible. To do otherwise would be to abandon our heritage and to
turn our Constitution on its head.
But the Supreme Court [in Smith] found that States do not have to
show a compelling interest in restricting a religious practice . . . ss
.

often lack the political power to obtain accommodations, Cong�ess concluded that legislation
was needed to preserve for them the same religious freedom enjoyed by more established
faiths."). Witnesses at the congressional hearings warned again and again that facially neu
tral laws had frequently been the instrument of state discrimination, intentional or uninten
tional, against religious minorities. See The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1992); id. at 5-7 (statement of William
Nouyi Yang) (discussing discrimination against Hmongs); id. at 27 (statement of Ger V.
Xiong, Hmong-Lao Unity Association, Inc.) (same); id. at 30-39 (statement of Dallin H.
Oaks, Quorum of the Twelve Apostles, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints) (discuss
ing discrimination against Mormons); id. at 63-64, 69-71, 129 (statements of Douglas Lay
cock, Professor, University of Texas School of Law); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of

1991:

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 1 02d Cong. (1992); id. at 23-25 (statement of Dallin H. Oaks, Quorum of the

1\velve Apostles, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints) (discussing discrimination
against Mormons); id. at 104 (statement of Nadine Strossen, President, National Board of
Directors, American Civil Liberties Union) ("It is the minority religions, the unpopular reli
gions, the new religions that are going to be discriminated against. "); id. at 1 07-08 (statement
of Wiiiiam Yang) (discussing discrimination against Hmongs); id. at 157-58 (statement of Ed
ward Gaffney, Dean and Professor of Law,Valparaiso University School of Law) (discussing
discrimination against Jehovah's Witnesses, Hmongs, Jews, Amish, and Muslims); id. at 326,
332-38, 398 (statement of Douglas Laycock, Professor, University of Texas School of Law);
id. at 406-08 (statement of Ruth Flower and Joanna P. McMann, Friends Committee on Na
tional Legislation). Representative Orton, a RFRA sponsor, quoted one "Elder Oaks, Apos
tle of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, " who "could not have stated it more
clearly when he said " that '"[t]he worshippers who need [Bill of Rights] protections are the
oppressed minorities, not the influential constituent elements of the majority.' " 139 CoNo.
REc. H2361 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (statement of Rep. Orton).
88. 139 CoNo. REc. H2362 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (statement of Rep. Lowey).
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In other words, the "religious diversity" that RFRA will protect
is to be contrasted with the "unity of religion" that obtains when
state law favors particular religious practices and prohibits the prac
tice of others. America's precious heritage of religious diversity
and freedom was achieved through disestablishment, but Smith has
"substantially eroded" this achievement. Smith allows states to
trample religious diversity by passing laws forbidding the practices
of '�[t]hose whose faiths differ[ ]." Only RFRA "can repair the
damage done." Only RFRA, in short, will vindicate our heritage of
disestablishment.

Representative Lowey's rhetoric may have been for the newspa
pers, but her logic was telling. Her remarks demonstrate two
things: not only did Congress make a law respecting establishment
when it passed RFRA, but it intended to do so.
C.

Both Pro-Establishment and Antiestablishment

To be sure, some of the laws that RFRA would have cut into
seem to bear no trace of religiosity about them. To take another
familiar case, persons who wish to use peyote for religious purposes
might have been able to mount strong challenges under RFRA to
state narcotics laws.89 But no one thinks of narcotics laws as carry
ing even a hint of establishment (even though such laws have al
most always exempted the sacramental use of wine).9° Can RFRA
really be viewed as a law respecting establishment in such a case?
Yes, and we have seen why already. The Establishment Clause
bars Congress from dictating to states the terms of religious neutral
ity that they must observe. The question is not whether the states
deliberately sought to take a position on religion - they may not
have - but whether Congress deliberately sought to dictate a posi
tion on religion to the states.91
But it is worthwhile to explore in more detail RFRA's effect on
laws that at least seem - and perhaps are - purely secular. Doing
89. But observe that Justice O'Connor, concurring in Smith, would have held that Ameri
can Indians were entitled to no such exemption under the pre-Smith test. See Employment
Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 903-07 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
90. The sacramental use of wine was exempted even during Prohibition. See National
Prohibition (Volstead) Act, Title II, § 3, 41 Stat.305, 307, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend.
XXI.
91. To use the World Congress hypothetical described above, see supra text accompany
ing notes 81-82, a world statute requiring strict scrutiny of all state action having a disparate
impact on racial minorities would be a law respecting racial discrimination even though the
state actors to whom it applied in a given case had not meant to take any position at all on
race or racial discrimination.
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so allows us to see how RFRA respected establishment in a simul
taneously pro-establishment and antiestablishment manner.
Suppose we granted that RFRA had nothing disestablish
mentarian about it as applied to narcotics laws. We would then be
saying that the effect of RFRA on narcotics laws had nothing what
soever to do with any conflict between majority and minority reli
gious practices. Narcotics laws are secular through and through, we
would be saying, and RFRA must in such a case be viewed as a law
forcing states to protect religion when the states sought to be
wholly secular. If so, then RFRA was a law respecting establish
ment in a pro-establishment vein. I am not saying that RFRA
thereby established religion, but RFRA clearly forced a state in
such a case to favor religion in its law more than the state wanted to
do.
In other words, where RFRA attacked laws that genuinely bear
no trace of religion, RFRA would have forced a secular state law to
provide special, preferential treatment to the religious. Where
RFRA attacked laws that do bear the stamp of religion, RFRA
would have almost always forced states to grant minority religious
practices the same degree of legal protection already enjoyed by
majority practices. In the first case, RFRA pushed states in the di
rection of establishment. In the second, RFRA pushed states away.
In both, it dictated church-state relations and violated the First

Amendment.
But let us not so quickly concede that RFRA, even as applied to
what seem the most secular of state laws, would have had no dis
establishing effect. Is there a single American statute in force that
requires conduct prohibited or forbids conduct required by the reli
gious practices of a majority of the persons in the relevant jurisdic
tion?92 Narcotics laws are hardly a counterexample. It is no
coincidence that the overwhelming run of our laws just happen not
to contradict the strictures of religion as practiced by the majority.93
In virtually every case in which RFRA had bite, it would have de
manded that states cease the favoritism of majority religious prac
tices that laws of general applicability inevitably reflect.
92. I mean the religious practices of the majority as that majority actually understands
and lives by those practices. Obviously a theologian may argue, for example, that some or all
of our laws requiring persons to support the nation's military apparatus violate the true re
quirements of Christianity. The point here is that such laws do not violate the majority's own
understanding of what its religion requires.
93. See Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 BYU L. REV.
299, 314 (stressing that democratic legislatures are not only unlikely intentionally to trans
gress against majority religious practices, but are equally unlikely to do so inadvertently).

August 1997]

Antidisestablishmentarianism

2369

Both the establishmentarian and disestablishmentarian aspects
of RFRA are brought home by Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. 94
and Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock. 95 In these cases, the Court
struck down under the Establishment Clause state efforts to accom
modate religious practices in a fashion similar, although by no
means identical, to the accommodation mandated by RFRA. In
Thornton, the Court invalidated a Connecticut statute giving all em
ployees the right to abstain from work on their Sabbath day, if they
had one.96 In Texas Monthly, the Court found an establishment in a
statute providing a tax exemption to certain religious publications.97
These cases do not compel the conclusion that RFRA established
religion, but they do compel the conclusion that RFRA was a law
respecting establishment.

Thornton and Texas Monthly leave no doubt that Congress had,
through RFRA, plunged headlong into a field of contending estab
lishment and antiestablishment forces. If one accepts the basic rea
soning in these cases, governmental efforts to carve solely religious
exceptions into generally applicable laws always raise establishment
issues - even if they do not establish - becaµse they favor the
religious over the nonreligious. RFRA was a clear illustration.
Nonreligious persons may have the deepest possible moral objec
tions to a state law - they may be burdened in the most profound
personal respects by a state law - but they must still obey it.98 Yet
persons with one particular kind of moral objection to the law namely, that it burdens their religious practices - receive special
legal protection. Under Thornton and Texas Monthly, this privileg
ing of religion may not actually establish, but it plainly respects es
tablishment. It concerns establishment, and it does so in a pro
religion, pro-establishment vein.
But from another point of view, RFRA entered the same field
with an antiestablishment slant. One (commendable) thing Con
necticut was trying to do in Thornton was to eliminate the favoring
of majority-religion Sunday-sabbath practices built into standard
workday rules. Connecticut was trying in this sense to disestablish,
and RFRA attempted to do the same. Why then was Connecticut
charged with establishing religion? Because, according to the Court
in Thornton (and Texas Monthly), a state crosses the line into estab94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

472 U.S. 703 (1985).
489 U.S. 1 (1989).
See Thornton, 472 U.S.at 710-11.
See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S.at 14-15.
See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 17, at 452-60.
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lishment when it seeks to give religious exemptions but either fails
to accommodate all religious practices equally or fails to strike the
proper balance between free exercise claims and secular interests.99
If RFRA had solved these problems - if, in other words, RFRA
was not an establishment under Thornton and Texas Monthly
then RFRA was a law that corrected overly establishmentarian state

-

efforts to accommodate religion, such as those in Thornton and
Texas Monthly. RFRA therefore respected (and disfavored) estab
lishment by ensuring that states accommodated religious practices
in non-establishing fashion.
These various views of RFRA are not mutually exclusive. A
law may be simultaneously establishmentarian and disestablish
mentarian. For example, a law might disestablish one Christian
sect, only to establish Christianity in general as the state's religion.
Whether RFRA (a) dictated pro-religion church-state relations, (b)
required states to give to minority religions the same favorable
treatment they already give to "established" religious practices, (c)
corrected overly establishmentarian state efforts to accommodate
religion, or (d) all of the above, RFRA represented a core violation
of the First Amendment.
D.

Why Antidisestablishmentarianism?

State favoritism of majority religion is a bad thing. Why labor to
recover a lost constitutional principle that prevents Congress from
taking action against something indefensible?

,

The Constitution's antidisestablishmentarian principle, strange
though it may at first seem, is in reality part of something deeply
familiar. To give Congress the power to dictate the terms of
church-state neutrality is to run counter to a basic First Amend
ment objective: the objective of maintaining a fundamental mea
sure of separation between religion and government. This is so
even though a disestablishmentarian law is by definition a law dis
entangling church and state.
Why? Because a disestablishmentarian law can simultaneously
be a law through which government commingles itself with religion
in the profoundest ways - favoring or disfavoring one or more or
all religions. When Maryland's 1776 constitution authorized the
legislature to "lay a general and equal tax, for the support of the
Christian religion[,] leaving to each individual the power" to desig99. See Thornton, 472 U.S. at 709; Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14-15.
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nate as recipient "any particular place of worship or minister," 100 it
thereby disestablished Episcopalianism, which had formerly en
joyed a monopoly on government support.101 The New England
laws mentioned earlier, which allowed localities to establish
churches by majority vote, were disestablishment provisions in the
eyes of some of their champions and in a very real sense. They gave
no legal pride of place to any church, instead at least formally treat
ing all (Protestant) sects alike.102 Disestablishments are not always
what they seem.
As a result, religious people have the most to fear from the con
gressional power that RFRA claimed. Perhaps in a few years, Con
gress will expressly decide that traditional marriage laws are too
religious. Accordingly, Congress passes the New Defense of Mar
riage Act of 2001, accompanied by copious findings indicating that
when the states enacted their marriage laws, they often did so with
express reference to protecting and preserving the sanctity of Chris
tian religious practices. This Defense of Marriage Act forces states
to permit marriages between any persons, and any number of per
sons, who wish to marry. Assume that this act rests solely on Con
gress's asserted authority under section 5 to enforce the religion
clauses against the states. Such a statute might well pass muster
under

Boerne.

Once again, I have no stake in traditional marriage laws, but I
suspect that the RFRA faithful would be aghast at this statute. I
suspect they would condemn this unprecedented seizure of congres
sional power with every argument they could muster. But if Con
gress has the power to dictate the terms of religious neutrality to
the states, the New Defense of Marriage Act would be constitu
tional. And it would vividly illustrate how a Congress vested with
the power to disestablish would be empowered to intrude - for
good or ill - into the nation's religious traditions.
Consider one more hypothetical. Imagine that Congress to
morrow deems state family law insufficiently protective of chil
dren's free exercise rights. As Congress sees it, state family law
unconscionably permits parents to inculcate children with a particu
lar religious faith. Accordingly, Congress enacts the Children's
Religious Freedom Act, which directs that states cannot vest par100. MD. CONST. OF 1776 art. XXXIII, reprinted in 3 FRANCIS NEwrON THORPE, THE
FEDERAL

AND

STATE CoNSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS

1686, 1689 (1909).
101. See LEVY, supra note 27, at 54.
102. See id. at 27-51; supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
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ents with unsupervised authority over their children's upbringing
unless the state ensures that parents do not "compel" their children
to practice one particular religion.
RFRA's backers would not likely support the Children's Reli
gious Freedom Act. They would probably say that it violates par

ents' free exercise or privacy rights. So it might, although this result
is not certain.103 The point is to see how a federal power to dictate
rules of religious neutrality for state law is a power to intercede
directly into the heart of individuals' religious practices. Even if the
Children's Religious Freedom Act did not violate parents' free ex
ercise or privacy rights, it would still violate the Establishment
Clause, because it would be an effort to dictate church-state rela
tions. The constitutional wall of separation between Congress and
religion may not be absolute, but to avoid a massive breach in it,
First Amendment antiestablishmentarianism is not enough. First
Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism is equally essential. For
in a federal system, absent a constitutional prohibition, the central
government can project its regulatory designs onto a subject matter
by prescribing rules either to individuals or to states. As the Chil
dren's Act vividly illustrates, a congressional power to regulate
church-state relations is a power to regulate the nation's religious
life.
RFRA is another vivid example. It was simultaneously the most
disestablishing law that Congress ever enacted and the most sys
tematic privileging of religion over nonreligion that Congress ever
enacted. Predictably, religious persons vigorously lobbied for
RFRA. But if RFRA had been upheld, they may have lived to re
gret their zeal.
The Establishment Clause, by barring Congress from dictating
church-state relations, does not create a states' rights zone of reli
gious affairs in which state legislatures have an unfettered power to
establish, persecute, or otherwise regulate as they see fit. The states
have no such unfettered power, thanks to the Fourteenth Amend
ment. Antidisestablishmentarianism is essential not to preserve
state sovereignty over religion, but to preserve individual religious
liberty.

103. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 (1972) (reserving the question of a state's
authority to protect children upon evidence that children were being trained in a religious
tradition "against their expressed desires ").
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THE EFFECT OF SECTION 5

Tum now to the Fourteenth Amendment. How does section 5
bear on the preceding conclusions?
A.

Section 5 and Constitutional Prohibitions

Whatever section 5 means, it is not a pro tanto repeal of every
constitutional limit on congressional power that came before it. If,

for example, Congress added to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a new punishment
for state actors who violate the Equal Protection Clause - namely,
slow torture by rack and iron - this new remedy would enforce the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it would still be un
constitutional. It would violate the Eighth Amendment, which con
tinues to stand as an independent prohibition limiting Congress's
section 5 power. As the Supreme Court has held for a century, sec
tion 5 does not permit Congress to violate independent constitu
tional rights or prohibitions laid out in the Bill of Rights or
elsewhere.104 "As broad as the congressional enforcement power
is" under the Civil War Amendments, "Congress may not by legis
lation repeal other provisions of the Constitution."105
In one critical respect, moreover, the Establishment Clause dif
fers from every other Bill of Rights guarantee incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The other guarantees do not mark out
subject-matter prohibitions· on· Congress's authority. Congress is

not barred from making any law "respecting" self-incrimination.
Thus if the Supreme Court tomorrow overruled Miranda v. Ari
zona, 106 Congress might constitutionally pass the Custodial Rights
Restoration Act, requiring as a matter of federal statutory law that
state police officers read the very same warnings the Court had just
104. See, e.g., Ex parte Virginia,100 U.S.339,345-46 (1879) ("Whatever legislation is ...
adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view ...if not prohibited, is brought
within the domain of congressional power." (emphasis added)), quoted in Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966). In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.112 (1970), the Court
struck down Congress's attempt to lower the voting age in state elections on the ground that
such an exercise of section 5 would violate limitations on Congress's powers implicitly estab
lished elsewhere in the Constitution. See 400 U.S. at 124-26 (Black,J., announcing the judg
ment of the Court); 400 U.S.at 154 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting); 400 U.S. at 294
(Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting). In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.448 (1980), the
Court considered (and rejected) a Fifth Amendment equal protection challenge to a federal
statute enacted under section 5. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097,2113,
2117 (1995),the Court went further, overturning Fullilove and other cases to the extent that
these cases held that federal measures enacted pursuant to section 5 were subject to lesser
equal protection limitations under the Fifth Amendment than those applicable to states
under the Fourteenth.
105. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 128.
106. 384 U.S.436 (1966).
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ruled unnecessary as a constitutional matter.

Boerne might counte
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nance such a law, and nothing in the Fifth Amendment would bar
it.
But when Congress acts to enforce

religious

rights against the

states, the situation is different. Did RFRA "enforce" free exercise
rights within the meaning of section 5? That question, interesting
as it is, turns out to be irrelevant. Even if yesterday's RFRA or
tomorrow's new and improved RFRA came within the terms of sec
tion 5, it would still violate the Establishment Clause and hence be
unconstitutional.
B.

Repealing the Establishment Clause

It would be possible to grant everything I have said so far and
still argue that RFRA was constitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The argument would run as follows. The Fourteenth
Amendment effected enormous changes in the relations between
the states and the federal government. It gave Congress substantial
new powers to pass laws directly targeting state action. Shouldn't
we read section 5, therefore, to have repealed or amended the
Establishment Clause so as to eliminate its bar on congressional
disestablishment?
The answer, I think, is plainly no. Constitutional law has lived
for a long time now with the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment
selectively "incorporates" the Bill of Rights against the states. But
no authority whatever supports the proposition that the Fourteenth
Amendment selectively eliminated any part of the Bill of Rights.
Even the terms of the Tenth Amendment are not, strictly speaking,
amended by the Fourteenth.
But the Tenth Amendment would be an inappropriate analogy
whether or not it had been, in some sense, amended by the Four
teenth. The Tenth Amendment sets forth no particular substantive
rights or freedoms. It marks out no specific domain of liberty into
which the federal ·government may not intrude. The Establishment
Clause does. To sustain RFRA under the Fourteenth Amendment,
it is not enough to say that section 5 granted Congress new powers
in addition to those it originally held under Article I. It is also nec
essary to say that the Fourteenth Amendment erased a specific,
substantive limitation on Congress's power laid down in the Bill of
Rights.
Will RFRA supporters make so bold an argument? It is long
established doctrine that repeals of statutory provisions must be ex-
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pressly made.101 Surely no less respect is due to constitutional pro
visions.108 Indeed, in the case of the Bill of Rights, this rule must
apply with the greatest possible force. Absent an express repealer,
I cannot imagine a court in this country knowingly holding that any
prohibition laid down in the Bill of Rights had been abolished. At
the very least, those who claim that such a repeal has taken place
must be held to a very substantial burden of proof, under which
they ought at least to show that such a repeal was the clear intent or
the unavoidable meaning of a later enactment. RFRA's supporters
have made no such showing, nor can they. The Fourteenth Amend
ment undoubtedly added to Congress's powers beyond those enu
merated in Article I, but it did not erase any of the specific
guarantees against Congress's power enumerated in the Bill of
Rights.
Perhaps a partisan of RFRA will deny this conclusion. "I don't
accept that," he might say. "The Court has expressly stated that the
Fourteenth Amendment altered the preexisting constitutional prin
ciples of federalism, and on that ground has held that section 5
trumps the Eleventh Amendment.109 Your antidisestablish
mentarian principle is in essence a principle of federalism. Thus
section 5 should trump the First Amendment's antidisestablish
mentarian principle as well."
Of course the Fourteenth Amendment permanently altered the
federalist structure of the United States government. Of course
section 5 is not limited by the principles of federalism expressed in
the Constitution prior to the Civil War. But as I have tried to show
throughout, the First Amendment's antidisestablishmentarian com
ponent is not and never was merely a protection of federalism. It is
not merely a states' rights or state sovereignty provision. First
Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism is a bulwark of religious
freedom. It is a bulwark of the fundamental principle of separation

107. See Saint Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 788
(1981).
108. State courts, having confronted the problem often enough, have repeatedly so held.
See, e.g., Moore v. McCuen, 876 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Ark.1994); City of San Francisco v. County
of San Mateo, 896 P.2d 181, 186 (Cal. 1995) ('"So strong is the presumption against implied
repeals' that we will conclude one constitutional provision impliedly repeals another only
when the more recently enacted of the two provisions constitutes a revision of the entire
subject matter addressed by the provisions." (quoting Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan, 616
P.2d 802 (Cal.1980))).
109. See Fitzpatrick v.Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holding that under section 5, Congress
may subject states to suit in federal court notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment).
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- whether this separation is defined as absolute or not - between
the national government and religious affairs.110
To repeat: Disestablishmentarian laws are not always what they
seem. A Congress entrusted with the power to dictate the terms of
church-state neutrality is empowered to disfavor religion alto
gether, to favor religion over nonreligion on a nationwide basis, to
decide which state laws excessively embody religious traditions, to
give special legal preferences to the religious while denying them to
the nonreligious, and in sum to intercede directly and profoundly
into religious affairs. The New Defense of Marriage Act described
above is one illustration.111 The Children's Religious Freedom Act
is another.112 RFRA is a third. To achieve separation between reli
gion and government in a multitiered political system, the higher
level of government must be prohibited from dictating church-state
relations at the subordinate levels - even from dictating them in a
nominally disestablishing vein.
The point of keeping Congress out of church-state relations is
not to give states unfettered authority to dictate religious affairs.
The point is to keep the nation's most powerful government from
mucking around in the nation's religious life.113 The erosion of
state sovereignty effected by the Fourteenth Amendment furnishes
no reason to erode the religious liberty protected by the First.
In fact, the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment partially

amended or repealed the Establishment Clause is profoundly per
verse. The argument, in its essentials, that a RFRA supporter must
make would be this: The Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon
the states the duty neither to establish religion nor to prohibit the
free exercise thereof, and it gave Congress power to enforce this
new duty. Therefore the Fourteenth Amendment repealed the First
Amendment to the extent that the First Amendment once prohib110.
111.
112.
113.

See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 103.
See id.

Hence the Court's holdings that section 5 overrides the Eleventh Amendment, see,
e.g., Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 445, are not applicable. The Eleventh Amendment does not
exclude Congress from regulating any particular subject matter and does not protect any
individual rights or freedoms; it merely protects an attribute of state sovereignty. See 427
U.S. at 456. Reading the Eleventh Amendment as it does, the Court has quite rightly held
"that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies
are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."
427 U.S. at 456 (citation omitted). By contrast, the Establishment Clause is not merely a
federalism or state-sovereignty provision. It is a subject-matter limitation on congressional
power, see supra Part I, a necessary piece of the constitutional separation of religion and
government, and hence a fundamental guarantor of religious liberty. See supra section 11.D.
• • •
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ited Congress from regulating the proper position of neutrality that
states must take toward religion.
This argument may at first seem logical, but it is not. Some
Americans of the founding era - including such towering figures as
Jefferson and Madison - believed that all government should keep
its hands, to the greatest extent possible, out of the domain of reli
gion.114 Others believed, on the contrary, that state or local govern

ment had the authority to intercede directly in religious life.115 But
both parties agreed that the national government should be kept
out. Virtually everyone agreed that vesting Congress with a power
to intermeddle in religious matters was a core evil to be avoided.116
Over the next seventy years, the view that state or local govern
ment should be able to legislate religion gradually dimmed. By
1833, all the New England states had abolished their town-by-town
establishment systems.117 In the decades before the Fourteenth
Amendment was enacted, state courts in growing numbers discov
ered in their own constitutions a principle of "complete separation
between Church and State."118 State courts reconceived blasphemy
laws and Sunday laws so that they became defensible on wholly sec
ular grounds or struck them down when they could not be so recon
ceived. 1 1 9
Assuming that the Fourteenth Amendment
memorialized in the federal Constitution this new principle of sepa
ration between state government and religion,120 this development
does not point to a reading of the Fourteenth Amendment that
would cut back on a fundamental element of the constitutional sep
aration between religion and government - as would a reading
114. See supra note 30.
115. See supra notes 51, 63.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 46-62.
117. Massachusetts, in 1833, became the last state to eliminate its local-establishment re
gime. See BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 24; LEVY, supra note 27, at 41-42.
118. Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502, 506 {1858). Cooley wrote just before ratification that
under American state constitutions, no legislature had the "liberty to effect a union of
Church and State." THOMAS M. CooLEY, A TREATISE ON TiiE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITA
TIONS WmcH REsT UPON TiiE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF TiiE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
UNION 469 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1868).
119. See Lash, supra note 72, at 1107-14.
120. There is some evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment's framers expressly so in
tended. Thus, Senator Lyman Trumbull excoriated the Southern Black codes because Blacks
were prohibited, among other things, from "'exercising the functions of a Ininister of the
Gospel'," CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS' DEBATES: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN
CONGRESS ON THE 13TH, 14TH, AND 15TH AMENDMENTS 121 {Alfred Avins ed., 1967), while
another Representative complained that "[u)nder the plea of Christianizing [Blacks], [the
South] has enslaved, beaten, maimed, and robbed Inillions of men," id. at 81.
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that repealed in part the Establishment Clause. It points to a read
ing that extends this constitutional separation.
In other words, by the 1860s, most American courts judged state
governmental intermeddling with religion to be as opprobrious as
federal intermeddling. In this sense, the Jeffersonian and Madis
onian view had prevailed. If, as a result, the Fourteenth Amend
ment finally took the hands of state actors off religion, the last thing
the Fourteenth Amendment should be read to do is to free Con
gress to put its hands on.

C.

Congress's Power to Enforce Religious Liberty

But perhaps one might object that this argument nullifies sec
tion 5 with respect to the religious rights protected by the Four
teenth Amendment. Am I saying in effect that the Fourteenth
Amendment should never have been construed to incorporate reli
gious rights, or, if it did incorporate such rights, that Congress is
powerless to enforce them?
Neither. To be sure, it is possible to mount a case against incor
poration of the religion clauses. A number of commentators have
reasoned that the Establishment Clause, as a provision designed to
keep Congress from interfering with state law, cannot coherently be
incorporated against the states.121 These scholars typically go on to
criticize the Court for invalidating state school-prayer laws, nondis
criminatory state aid for religious schools, and so on.122
This argument - that the Establishment Clause, because of its
antidisestablishmentarian component, cannot logically be incorpo
rated - might, if acceptable, have strengthened the case against
RFRA. But the argument has always seemed specious. It is a pris
oner of the rhetoric we use when we speak of incorporating
121. See, e.g., BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 95 ("To the extent 'respecting an' is thus accu
rately emphasized, incorporation of the Establishment Clause (via the Fourteenth Amend
ment) becomes logically impossible; it would be like trying to apply the Tenth Amendment to
the states. How does one translate 'Congress shall not interfere with state practices' into a
command to state governments?"); Lietzau, supra note 62, at 1210; Joseph M. Snee, Religious
Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 407 ("The inclu
sion of the establishment clause into the liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment by the
Supreme Court has no firm basis in the history of the clause or in logic
); Note, Rethink
ing the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1700, 1703 (1992).
122. See, e.g., BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 135-46; Lietzau, supra note 62, at 1210. Profes
sor Bybee argues that both religion clauses, together with all other provisions of the First
Amendment, are "fundamentally different from the other amendments in the Bill of Rights"
and should be treated differently in incorporation analysis. See Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liber
ties with the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 48 VAND. L. R.Ev. 1539, 1577 (1995).
• • . ."
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"clauses" from the Bill of Rights into the due process guarantee of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The real question of incorporation is not a matter of clauses but
of rights: the question is which constitutional liberties - which
privileges or immunities - the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
against state abridgment.123 A court could logically hold that the
Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon the states the First Amend
ment's antiestablishment duty without imposing on them the First
Amendment's antidisestablishment duty. On the other hand, a
court could also hold that the Fourteenth Amendment does make
an antidisestablishmentarian principle applicable against the states
as well.124 Both of these possibilities, however, suggest only that
the Fourteenth Amendment at most duplicated the Establishment
Clause, in part or in whole, as a constitutional guarantee against
state action, not that the Fourteenth Amendment repealed the
Establishment Clause, in part or in whole, as a guarantee against
congressional action.
But what of the claim that I have made section 5 a nullity in the
area of religion? Notwithstanding the Establishment Clause, Con
gress remains empowered under section 5 to enforce Fourteenth
Amendment religious rights against the states. At a minimum,
Congress undoubtedly has the authority (1) to enable individuals to
bring claims against state actors to enforce their religious liberties,
and (2) to provide for the enforcement of any judgment that Four
teenth Amendment religious rights have been violated - a power
that probably includes the authority to provide for special remedies
in such cases. One might object that even a statute like 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 would, on the account elaborated here, "respect" an estab
lishment of religion as applied to religious liberty claims, and hence
be unconstitutional. The answer to this objection is that such a law
would be no more unconstitutional than one allowing individuals to
bring an action claiming that Congress had established religion. To
be more than hortatory, the Establishment Clause must permit
Congress to create the underlying judicial machinery and causes of
action through which Establishment Clause claims may be vindi123. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE
L.J. 1193, 1262-66 (1992).
124. The principle would apply not to the state's local government law, but to its family
law. Suppose a state were to pass its own Children's Religious Freedom Act, preventing
parents from exposing their children to only one religion. Insofar as parents in essence estab
lish a religion within the family, this statute could be seen as an attempt to disestablish reli
gion within the sphere of parental authority. Just as the First Amendment bars Congress
from dictating church-state relations, a Fourteenth Amendment antidisestablishmentarian
principle could bar states from dictating church-family relations.
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cated. Nothing I have said requires that "respecting an establish
ment" be interpreted so perversely as to bar Congress from passing
laws of general applicability that permit individuals to enforce their
First Amendment rights on terms similar to the enforcement of any
other constitutional rights.
What Congress may not do is attempt to specify the rules of the
states' duty not to establish. Congress may not dictate what rules
states must follow to achieve the proper neutrality toward all reli
gious practices or to avoid excessive favoritism of any or all reli
gions. Any such congressional statute would be a foursquare
instance of a law respecting an establishment of religion and hence
a violation of the First Amendment.125 With respect to state reli
gious neutrality under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can
still enforce whatever duties the Constitution requires of the states.
But Congress cannot do what section 5 evidently permits it to do
elsewhere: "prohibit[ ] constitutional state action."126
D.

The Establishment Clause in Court

We can now resolve a final puzzle. How could RFRA violate
the Establishment Clause if it merely codified the same standard of
review that the Supreme Court used to impose on free exercise
claims? Conversely, if RFRA did violate the Establishment Clause,
then wasn't the judiciary also violating that clause when, during the
reign of Sherbert v. Verner, it applied the compelling governmental
interest test against the states?
On the contrary: The Establishment Clause permits courts to
order disestablishment and to define the terms of disestablishment,
even though it forbids Congress to do so. How can this be? How
can the Establishment Clause fail to apply to the courts in the same
way that it applies to Congress?
The asymmetry is inherent - and has always been inherent in the Establishment Clause itself. If Congress passed a law making
Anglicanism the nation's official religion, obviously the Establish
ment Clause would require a court to strike down the law. But in
doing so, the court would necessarily render a judgment respecting
an establishment of religion. In every case where it reaches the
125. The only way such a law could be constitutional would be if its rules were already
commanded by the Constitution, so that Congress would not in fact specify what states may
or may not do with respect to religion but merely provide for causes of action and for reme
dies. Title VII, insofar as it applies to state actors who discriminate on the basis of religion,
probably counts as an example of this sort of law.
126. City of Boerne v. Flores, 65 U.S.L.W. 4612, 4619 (U.S. June 25, 1997).
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merits of an Establishment Clause claim, the judiciary must render
a judgment and indeed, in the judicial sense, make law respecting an

establishment of religion. Which is to say that under the Establish
must do what Congress cannot do. Congress

ment Clause, courts

here labors under a subject-matter limitation on its powers, but the
courts do not. Thus if a state enacted a statute making Christianity
its official religion, the courts must discharge the task of determin
ing that this statute is invalid. Similarly, only the courts can deter
mine whether state laws of general applicability that burden
religious practices are valid or invalid. Congress cannot do so.
The Establishment Clause, as a subject-matter limitation on
Congress, cannot apply to the judiciary in the same way it applies to
the legislature. The judiciary must police church-state relations, but
Congress has no such police power.
IV.

POSTSCRIPT: SMITH

The foregoing does not compel any particular result in the doc

Sherbert v. Verner and Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith. In deciding
trinal clash between

the scope of free exercise rights, the Court is not constrained by an
antidisestablishmentarian principle. Even though Congress cannot
constitutionally enact the compelling interest test for free exercise
claims, the Court may constitutionally readopt it.
Nevertheless, there is something to be said in

Smith's defense
Smith's de

that previous commentary has not clearly emphasized.
tractors have repeatedly argued that

Smith

eviscerated religion's

protected constitutional status. Religion, these critics say, now re
ceives no greater protection under the First Amendment than con
stitutionally unprotected activities receive under the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses.127 Smith's supporters give credibility
to this claim when they argue that "there is no constitutional justifi
cation for the privileging of religion. "128
Of course there is: the First Amendment. The privileging of
religion requires no other constitutional justification. But

Smith

does not eviscerate this privilege. It does not treat religion on a par
with constitutionally unprotected activities.

On the contrary, it

treats religion on a par with political dissent, whose pride of place
in constitutionally protected activity is not open to doubt.
127. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 66, at 11 ("In the Court's view, religious use of peyote,
or of wine, is no more protected by the Constitution than is recreational use.").
128. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 17, at 448.
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Can you be thrown in jail for expressing your political opinion?
Certainly. It all depends on how you express it. You cannot, for
example, express your opinion by declining to pay your taxes, by
driving in excess of the speed limit, or by blowing your neighbor's
head off. You cannot even use the fact that you were expressing an
idea to demand that the government show a compelling interest be
hind its law.129 The fact that you were acting on a political opinion
gains you no special exemption - from a valid law of general
applicability.
But if the law penalizes you for an action on the ground that you
were expressing a political opinion, then the story is different. Then,
whether your action consisted of words or conduct, you will be con
stitutionally protected. Even if you display the very symbol of
genocidal evil, you will be protected from a law that targets your
action on the basis of the political opinion it expresses.130 This is
just the protection that Smith recognizes for religiously motivated
conduct. A law that targets religiously motivated conduct is uncon
stitutional, but a generally applicable law remains enforceable
against religiously motivated conduct so long as its bar operates
without reference to the religious motivation.131 In other words,
under Smith, political opinion and religious motivation receive
equally profound constitutional protection. They are protected
from any legislation singling them out or targeting them for adverse
treatment. But they provide no basis on which a person can claim
exemption from a generally applicable law.
This does not mean that Smith reduces the free exercise guaran
tee to a redundancy, protecting against only those laws that would
independently violate the freedom of speech. Smith fully protects
practitioners of religious animal sacrifice from adverse legislation
even if their conduct would not qualify as speech so as to trigger the
129. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (upholding against First Amend
ment challenge, and without the application of the compelling interest test, enhanced punish·
ment for a race-motivated assault); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984)
("[V]iolence or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms
distinct from their communicative impact
are entitled to no constitutional protection.");
United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1973) (upholding conviction of a defend·
ant who refused to pay taxes on political grounds). The various prongs of the so-called
O'Brien test applying to symbolic or nonverbal speech are best understood as ensuring that
the law at issue, or its application in a given case, is genuinely unrelated to the communica·
tive impact of the conduct regulated. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77
(1968).
.

•

.

130. See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
131. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990).
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free speech guarantee.132 And practitioners of religious animal sac
rifice are protected even though hunters are not: killing animals for
sport could be singled out and prohibited, even though killing ani
mals for religious purposes cannot. In general, when prohibiting
noncommunicative conduct x, legislatures are free to single out and
proscribe the doing of x with a particular intention or purpose doing x for sport, doing x with the intent to threaten - rather than
banning all instances of x. What distinguishes religion is that the_
First Amendment forbids government to make a religious intention
or purpose into the defining element of a legal liability. Smith hon
ors that constitutionally special status.
CONCLUSION

If states no longer have the right to establish religion, what is
the point of an antidisestablishmentarian principle? Wasn't this
state right the predicate of the Establishment Clause, and doesn't
its elimination make antidisestablishmentarianism an anachronism?

Eliminating the states' privilege to establish means that the Es
tablishment Clause no longer serves the same "federalist" or state
sovereignty function it once did. But antidisestablishmentarianism
remains a necessary piece of the religion clauses' central objective:
preventing Congress from supervising the nation's religious life.
Without an antidisestablishmentarian bar operative . against Con
gress, the national legislature will be constantly tempted to correct
what it deems an imbalance in the states' relation to religion. It will
become the manager of church-state relations all over the country,
giving religious persons special rights in one case, taking them away
in the next. Perhaps traditional marriage laws will be the next tar
get of congressional management, or perhaps Congress will deem
state family law insufficiently protective of children's free exercise
rights.
Subject to the duty neither to establish nor to prohibit free exer
cise, a state is obliged to make numerous decisions on religious mat
ters, including decisions about what degree of accommodation to
accord the claims of religious practices in managing its work force,
in administering its public schools, and in drafting all of its laws of
132. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(striking down an ordinance prohibiting ritual animal sacrifice). A sole practitioner of
Santerian animal sacrifice need not be engaging in "conduct possess[ing] sufficient communi
cative elements to bring the [Free Speech Clause of the] First Amendment into play." Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989). But he would still be protected under Smith and
Hialeah.
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general applicability. The federal government faces the same ques
tions in its own province. If the states' usual answer to such ques
tions will be to give minority religious practices short shrift, and if
we regard this state of affairs as a malady, why doesn't the Constitu
tion tolerate a congressionally prescribed remedy? Because the
cure, the nation recognized long ago, would be worse than the
disease.

